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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 07-2096
__________
AARDVARK CHILD CARE 
AND LEARNING CENTER, INC.; 
JOANNE DRINKARD;
FRANCIS T. GREISER; 
MARIAN K. GREISER
   v.
THE TOWNSHIP OF CONCORD; JOHN W. CORNELL,
In His Individual And Official Capacity 
As Township Manager Through 2002; 
ROBERT WILLARD, In His Individual And Official Capacity
As Township Manager Through 2003; 
CHAD W. INGRAM, In His Individual And Official Capacity
As Township Engineer; 
MANOS KAVADIAS, In His Individual And Official Capacity 
As Code Enforcement Officer;
JOHN F. ALEXANDER, In His Individual And Official Capacity 
As A Township Zoning Officer; 
PENNONI ASSOC INC, In Their Official Capacity 
As The Township's Traffic Engineering Consultants; 
RONALD C. MOORE, JR., In His Individual And Official Capacity 
As An Employee Of Pennoni Associated Inc.; 
FREDRICK FIELD, In His Individual And Official Capacity 
As The Townships Fire Marshall
*TERRY ELIZABETH SILVA and SILVA & ASSOCIATES,P.C.,
                                                                         Appellants
*(Pursuant to Rule 12(a), FRAP)
__________
2On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-05249)
District Judge: Honorable James T. Giles 
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on June 30, 2008
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  July 30, 2008)
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Although they are not parties in the underlying action, the appellants in this case
are Terry Silva and her law firm, Silva & Associates, P.C. (collectively “Silva”).  Silva
represented Aardvark Child Care and Learning Center, Inc., Joanne Drinkard, Francis
Greisser, and Marian Greisser (collectively “Aardvark”) in their civil rights suit against
the Township of Concord, John Alexander, John Cornell, Frederick Field, Chad Ingram,
Manos Kavadias, Ronald Moore, Robert Willard, and Pennoni Associates, Inc.
(collectively “the Township”).  Aardvark and the Township are the appellees.  Silva is
appealing from a pair of District Court orders denying three motions that she filed against
the Township, Aardvark, and Ronald Surkin, the attorney who succeeded her as
3Aardvark’s counsel.  For the reasons that follow, we will remand to the District Court for
resolution of a pending motion for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11, on which at least part of Silva’s appeal depends. 
Aardvark filed a lawsuit against the Township in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
certain land use decisions discriminated against Aardvark based on the racial makeup of
its clients.  The Township filed (1) a motion for summary judgment; (2) a motion for
attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (3) a Rule 11 motion for sanctions
against Aardvark and Silva, alleging that the § 1983 suit was frivolous.  The District
Court granted the Township’s motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 suit, and, as
per Aardvark’s instructions, Silva then prepared and filed an appeal.  Aardvark hired
different counsel, Ronald Surkin, to represent it as to the Township’s pending fee and
sanctions motions.
The District Court scheduled a hearing on the Township’s fee motion against
Aardvark and the Township’s sanctions motion against both Aardvark and Silva, but
cancelled it at the last minute in order to give Silva, Aardvark, and the Township another
opportunity to negotiate a global settlement.  The Township and Aardvark settled all of
the claims between them (i.e., Aardvark’s § 1983 suit against the Township pending on
appeal and the Township’s fee and sanctions motions against Aardvark).  Silva was not a
party to this settlement, but alleges that she, the Township, and Aardvark had previously
4agreed on the outline of a settlement that included payment to Silva of a portion of her
outstanding legal fees and the dismissal of the Township’s Rule 11 motion pending
against Silva.  
Silva filed three motions, two before the Township and Aardvark reached their
settlement and one after.  The first motion asked the District Court to issue sanctions
against Aardvark and Surkin, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, to require them to pay legal
fees due to Silva for her representation of Aardvark.  The second asked the Court to order
the Township’s counsel, pursuant to Rule 11(c), to pay the expenses that Silva incurred in
defending against the Rule 11 motion that the Township filed against her.  The third was
a “Motion to Vacate Settlement or, in the Alternative, for Costs and Fees on
Enforcement.” 
Before a ruling was issued on any of Silva’s motions, Aardvark and the Township
filed a “Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal” with the District Court, asking the Court,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), to “please dismiss the above-
captioned action, by stipulation of the parties, with prejudice, with each party to pay its
own fees and costs.”  (Supp. App. 3.)  Similarly, before we issued any ruling as to
Aardvark’s merits appeal, Aardvark and the Township filed a “Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal,” asking us,  pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), to
“[p]lease dismiss the above-captioned appeal by agreement of the parties . . . with each
5party to pay its own fees and costs.” (Supp. App. 1.)  Surkin, not Silva, represented
Aardvark at this stage.  
Subsequently, on January 18, 2007, the District Court issued an order denying
Silva’s three pending motions on jurisdictional grounds.  The Court explained:  
The parties in the above captioned matter have filed with the Court a
Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to [Rule] 41(a)(1).  Attorney
Silva is not a party to this action.  The Court’s jurisdiction is terminated
after a stipulation of dismissal is entered by all parties to the action, and the
Court lacks authority to impose a subsequent condition on a stipulated
dismissal or the jurisdiction to reopen a dismissed case. [Rule] 41(a)(1)(ii). 
Thus, absent an agreement by the parties that it retain jurisdiction or some
other independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court lacks the
authority to review issues raised in a motion to vacate settlement or
belatedly to impose costs and fees. 
By their mutual dismissal of all pending claims and contentions, the
parties to the lawsuit terminated all section 1927 claims asserted, directly or
indirectly, for or against the other, including the derivative claims of
Plaintiffs’ Attorney Silva against Defendants.  Plaintiffs’ separate
settlement attorney is, for these purposes, the same as Plaintiffs.  
Finally, disputes as between Attorney Silva and her clients cannot be
raised in this civil action.  
(App. 611-12).
After Silva filed a motion for reconsideration, the District Court issued another
order, on March 15, 2007, this one only addressing Silva’s motions for fees and sanctions. 
The District Court “assume[d] discretionary jurisdiction” this time around but still ruled
against Silva.  (App. 615.)  The Court explained:
Being familiar with the global mediation efforts of the parties and
Attorney Silva, the Court finds that the Silva Motion for Sanctions and Fees
     Rule 11(c) read slightly differently prior to the non-substantive amendment that1
became effective December 1, 2007.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes
(“The language of Rule 11 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent
throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.”)   
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is without merits.  Attempts at a global resolution of all disputes and claims
in, or arising from, the above-captioned matter under the mediation auspices
of the Court, though unsuccessful, cannot be construed as Rule 11
violations or as a basis for Section 1927 sanctions.  (The latter relates to
undue multiplicity of proceedings, which has no applicability here.)
Attorney Silva’s unreimbursed expenses arise solely from her
representation of Plaintiffs, or her acceptance of the risk of rejecting a
global resolution.  In any event, she cannot transfer those costs over to
Defendants under any legally cognizable theory.
(App. 615-16.)
Silva has appealed the District Court’s denial of all three motions, arguing that the
Court erred in a variety of ways.  We, however, will only address the Court’s denial of
Silva’s motion to recover the expenses that she incurred in defending against the
Township’s Rule 11 motion.
Rule 11(c) provides that “[i]f warranted, the court may award to the prevailing
party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred for the motion.”   At this1
juncture, however, it is impossible to determine whether Silva is the “prevailing party”
because the District Court never resolved the Township’s Rule 11 motion that is still
     In contrast to the District Court’s statement in its January 18, 2007 order, the Supreme2
Court has made clear that a court retains jurisdiction over sanctions motions even after the
underlying action has been voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a).  See Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmart Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 394-98 (1990).  Further, we note that when the
District Court changed its mind upon reconsideration and exercised jurisdiction over
Silva’s Rule 11-based motion, it appears to have misconstrued the substance of that
motion.  As recounted above, the District Court denied the motion because “attempts at a
global resolution of all disputes and claims in, or arising from, the above-captioned matter
under the mediation auspices of the Court, though unsuccessful, cannot be construed as
Rule 11 violations.”  (App. 615.)  But Silva had not alleged that anyone had violated
Rule 11.  Rather, she had moved to recover the expenses that she had incurred in
defending against the Township’s claim that she had violated Rule 11.  Thus, the District
Court may wish to reconsider its ruling on Silva’s motion once it resolves the Township’s
pending Rule 11 motion.    
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pending against her.  Accordingly, we will remand for the District Court to resolve the
Township’s pending Rule 11 motion.    2
Our recent opinion in Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2008),
counsels us to refrain from giving further consideration at this point to any of Silva’s
challenges to the District Court’s orders.  Drawing on our decision in Mary Ann Pensiero,
Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1988), we ruled in Gary that “district courts must
resolve any issues about imposition of sanctions prior to, or contemporaneously with,
entering final judgment.”  Id. at 201-02 & n.7.  Applying this principle to Silva’s case, we
conclude that the District Court must resolve the Township’s pending Rule 11 motion
before we may address any other issues.
8In light of the foregoing, we will REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.
__________________
